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Abstract
Taking the initiative is a crucial element of leadership and an important asset for many
jobs. We assess leadership in a game in which it emerges spontaneously since people have
a non-obvious possibility to take the initiative. We can show that leadership in this game
correlates with real life activities associated with taking the initiative. Combining the
game with small experimental games and questionnaires, we investigate the motives and
personality characteristics that entail leadership. We ﬁnd e ciency concerns and generos-
ity to be important determinants of leadership. Leaders have an internal locus of control
and are more patient than non-leaders, but they are not di↵erent from the non-leaders
with respect to risk attitude. Response time patterns and the results from the cognitive
reﬂection test show that cognitive resources are relevant in the decision to lead.
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11 Introduction
Imagine you share an apartment with roommates and the dirty dishes are piling up in the
kitchen. With every additional plate, empty space in the kitchen disappears. Eventually, the
ﬁlth tolerance level of one of the roommates is surpassed and this poor person starts doing
the dishes. Often this initiative encourages roommates to follow the good example. Everybody
likes having such leaders as roommates, and human resource departments have a strong interest
in recruiting these personalities as well. Taking the initiative is not only important as a leader
selection device. In any bad state of social interaction it is desirable that someone breaks the
vicious circle by giving a good example, but only some actually do so. We are interested in
the characteristics of those who do. In a discussion with a teacher, who ﬁrst raises a point
about an unfair exam? Who starts using nets with larger mesh size at a lake that tends to be
overﬁshed? Another economically relevant example is the open source community. Without
people like Linus Torwalds who initiate a project and contribute a signiﬁcant code base, open
source projects will never start (Lerner and Tirole 2002). Therefore, it would be desirable to
know the determinants of this behavior. What motivates people to take the initiative and set
the good example?
As we have seen in the illustrations above, leading-by-example is a behavior in which a
leader aims to induce others to act in the group’s joint interest by demonstrating the behavior
that they should imitate. Taking the initiative is, thus, a particular type of leadership which
is voluntary not only from the side of the followers but also from the side of the leader. The
situation is characterized by the following features. First, the leader has to understand and
anticipate the response of the followers. The action that motivates others to follow is not
always easy to ﬁnd. Concerning the characteristics of leaders, we therefore expect cognitive
skills and the willingness to use them to be important for leading. Second, leading-by-example
is initially costly (i.e. the leader has to incur some cost or forgo possible gains, which might
be recovered later) but successful leadership is beneﬁcial for the group. Leading-by-example
could be driven by selﬁsh proﬁt maximization if the leader believes that leadership pays in
the long run. However, the beneﬁt accrues in the future, which implies that patience could
play a role in peoples’ willingness to lead. Risk preferences are also expected to matter for
leadership behavior because whether it pays o↵ is not certain. Other-regarding preferences like
2altruism, generosity and e ciency should also matter, because the group as a whole beneﬁts
from leadership. Finally, leaders get a special role by their behavior. They get a positive image,
which could also be a motivation to lead.
We suppose that taking the initiative is also driven by an implicit power motive (Fodor
2010), i.e. a concern for having an impact. The notion most closely related to our research
topic is charismatic or transformational leadership (Bass and Avolio 1994). The explicit power
motive, e.g. a self-deﬁned goal to be in a leading position, in contrast, relates to other concepts
of leadership discussed in the literature (Yukl 2009; Kouzes and Posner 2007) where the focus
is on advising designated leaders. An implicit power motive is di cult to determine because
people who explicitly want to be a leader without having a particularly social motivation would
also state in a simple questionnaire that they take the initiative whenever possible. The most
common measurement method in psychology is the picture story exercise (Pang 2010). In
this test, ambiguous pictures of everyday situations are presented to participants, who have
to imagine and write stories explaining the picture. The written stories are interpreted by the
experimenter as representing a stronger or weaker implicit power motive. In this paper we use
an experiment which can identify people who take the initiative in a much simpler way.
Because of the incentive structure of leading-by-example, this kind of leadership is often
studied by introducing a sequential move structure in public good experiments (G¨ achter and
Renner 2006; G¨ uth et al. 2007; G¨ achter et al. forthcoming; Moxnes and van der Heijden 2007;
Pogrebna et al. forthcoming; Potters et al. 2007; Levati et al. 2007). These studies focus on
the mechanism of leadership and typically show that groups with leaders on average contribute
more than groups without, but only due to the higher contributions of the leaders. Arbak and
Villeval (2007) investigated the motivations of leaders in this situation and combined di↵erent
variants of a two-stage public good game with personality tests. They showed that social
concerns are a driving force for at least some of their leaders.
Public good games capture nicely the incentive structure of leading-by-example. However,
in these games it is obvious to all players what constitutes the good example and, therefore, they
do not cover the innovative facet of the act of taking the initiative. Furthermore, it is always
clear to the subjects that the experiment they are participating in is about leading and following.
This may induce experimenter demand e↵ects (Zizzo 2010) possibly manipulating leadership
3in either direction. It may reduce leadership because involuntary leaders perform worse; or it
may enhance leadership, because even natural non-leaders infer from the experimental design
that leadership is socially desirable. In order to avoid the experimenter demand e↵ect problem
and to include the innovative element of leadership in the design, we use a completely di↵erent
setup to study leadership. In our design, there is no predeﬁned leader. So we not only address
the question of whether a person accepts to be a leader when she is assigned the role but also
whether a person chooses to voluntarily lead. We build on a game introduced by Dufwenberg
and Gneezy (2000) to study the Bertrand paradox and interpreted by Bruttel (2009) in terms of
leading-by-example. In this two player game, people choose a number between 2 and 100. The
person setting the lower number gets the number she chose as a payo↵; the other gets nothing.
In the case of a tie both receive half the price. This game is repeatedly played with changing
pair composition, but all eight subjects in a group are informed about the decisions of all players
in their group after the end of each round. In the experiment, the numbers decrease to a rather
low level and earnings are low. Eventually though, one player raises the number to a very high
level. Many of the other players follow, so a temporary increase of the numbers occurs. In the
present study we consider subjects who initiate a number increase to be leaders. Di↵erent from
other experiments about leadership, the leading behavior in this experiment is neither explicitly
nor implicitly induced by the experimenter. There is no explicit assignment of the leading role
to a certain subject. Decision making occurs simultaneously, so no player has a distinct role.
Nevertheless, this design has proven to produce reliable rates of leadership. We use the sudden
number increase in this game to identify natural leaders and connect this classiﬁcation to the
decisions in other games and questionnaires eliciting other-regarding preferences, beliefs, risk
attitude, patience, cognitive abilities, and other personality characteristics.
According to our results, leaders are characterized by above-average cognitive skills and
are predominantly male. They have strong preferences for e ciency, generosity, and against
advantageous inequality, and do not primarily seek to maximize their personal monetary beneﬁt.
They have accurate beliefs about the extent to which others will follow their example but rather
underestimate the probability that other players will act as leaders as well. Leaders in the
experiment have an internal locus of control and are more patient than non-leaders, but we
do not ﬁnd an impact of the big ﬁve personality traits or risk attitude on leading-by-example.
Finally, we can show that leaders as identiﬁed in the experiment are also more likely than
non-leaders to engage in activities associated with taking the initiative in their real lives.
4In section 2 of this paper, we present the design we use in the experiment. In section 3 we
provide the behavioral predictions. Section 4 presents our ﬁndings and section 5 concludes.
2 Design and Procedures
2.1 Design
In order to determine the motivations of leaders, we combine a game in which spontaneous
leadership occurs regularly with a series of experiments and questionnaires that allow the mea-
surement of beliefs, risk and social preferences as well as other motivations. We start with the
explanation of the game that we use as our leadership game.
The basic design of the game in our experiment is a variant of the stylized Bertrand pricing
game in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000). In this game, two participants simultaneously choose
a number from the interval [2,100]. The participant choosing the lower number wins the game.
The prize is equal to the winning number. In case of a tie, each participant gets half of the
prize. The game is repeated for 30 rounds. Players are divided into groups of eight participants.
In each round, the eight participants in one group are randomly matched in pairs of two. Thus,
four pairs play the game simultaneously in a group of eight participants.
It is known from Bruttel (2009) that the behavior in the experiment crucially depends on
the feedback condition. If subjects only get feedback from their own pair, then the chosen
numbers continuously decline. However, if subjects are informed about all decisions from their
group, typically a cyclical movement of average numbers is observed. In the beginning, the
eight numbers within a group are uniformly drawn from the set between 2 and 100. During
the ﬁrst few rounds, average numbers decrease, because all participants try to choose a number
slightly lower than most of the others. Strategies in this phase of the game are well described by
directional best reply to the distribution of numbers in the previous round. After some rounds,
the group reaches a relatively low level of numbers. Eventually, one of the players chooses
a very high number (often even 100), presumably to signal to the others that they should
coordinate at a higher level. Such signaling is only possible because of the group feedback after
each round. This behavior is in no way induced by the experimental instructions, but appears
5to be very robust. We consider the initiative to coordinate at a higher level to be endogenous
leading-by-example. The person who takes the initiative, we call a “leader”.
In the experiment, after each round, the subjects were informed about the decisions in their
group. Furthermore, all 8 numbers were made publicly known in the group, ordered by size of
the number. Thus, players not only received feedback about their own number and the number
of their partner in this period, but also about the other participants whom they did not meet
in the current round but might meet in the next rounds.
Each number choice decision in this main part of the experiment was surrounded by a belief
formation stage and a publicity choice stage. In the belief formation stage before the number
choice, players had to submit beliefs about the minimum, maximum, and average number of
the other seven players in the next round. For each of the three values, they had to submit
a probability distribution over the intervals 2-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 81-100. To facilitate
submission of their beliefs, they were provided a graphical tool on the computer screen. Figure
12 in the Appendix shows a screen shot. The bars of the single intervals could be moved with
mouse clicks. A click on “update” next to one of the distributions automatically increased or
decreased all ﬁve bars proportionally to balance the sum of weights to 100 percentage points. If
participants were done with their belief formation, they had to click “next”. In the beginning
of the next round, their past estimates were shown as default values and could be adapted with
the same procedure. The quality of their prediction for each of the three values was determined
with the quadratic scoring rule (Brier, 1950). They received a payment proportional to this
measure.
By asking subjects before their decision for their belief about the probability distribution of
the maximum number of the other group members in the next period, we learn how likely they
think it is that someone else will lead. In particular, we need the probability weight leaders
assign to the categories equal to or larger than their own leading number. The estimated
average number of the other group members one round after a leading number provides an
approximation of the leader’s belief on the extent to which the others will follow. For our
analysis, we re-calculate the estimated average from the submitted probability distribution. By
comparing the beliefs of leaders to the beliefs of other not leading participants, we learn whether
leaders are di↵erent from others with respect to their estimate of the beneﬁts of leadership. The
6stronger the increase in the average number after a leading number, the higher are the potential
gains to a participant undercutting opponents by a small amount. If leaders systematically
overestimate others’ average numbers after a leading number, this would indicate that leaders
lead because they overestimate their monetary beneﬁts from leading.
In addition to the maximum and the average number, we asked players to submit their
belief about the minimum number of the other group members which we do not need for the
analysis at all. We elicit beliefs in such a detailed way to receive an accurate belief of leaders on
whether there will be another leader. Asking for the probability of the maximum number only,
however, could introduce the experimenter demand e↵ects again which we were able to avoid
by the design of the main part. In order not to lead subjects into thinking about leadership, we
therefore included the minimum belief and applied the distributional belief elicitation procedure
to all three values, minimum, maximum, and average.
In the publicity stage after the number choice, we allowed players in the given round to
give up anonymity and publish their seat number on the other participants’ computer screens
beside their own chosen number. Publication of the seat number in one round cost 10 points
and could be decided upon by ticking a box on a separate screen after the number choice. Use
of this feature allows us to control for whether appreciation by others motivated extraordinary
number choices. Paying for publishing the seat number might not only be due to the leader’s
desire to become publicly known as a leader but also be used to strengthen the signaling e↵ect
of the leading number. It certainly emphasizes the leading number on the other participants’
computer screens if the additional seat number entry is displayed as well. To test whether
leaders do not want attention for themselves but for their number, we added a highlight option
to the publicity feature in the second half of the sessions we conducted. In addition to the
option to display their seat number at a cost of 10 points, participants could also choose to
highlight their number anonymously on the others’ screens by displaying three exclamation
marks aside their number in that round.
Before the main part of the experiment, we conducted some short games to elicit preferences
for e ciency, generosity, inequality aversion and risk attitude. Table 1 includes an overview
of the order of the di↵erent games in the experiment. We applied the same order of these
experiment to all the subjects. This procedure has the disadvantage that there might be
7Treatment Description
1 Distribution games (e ciency, inequality, generosity)
2 Risk elicitation
3 Belief trial phase (only in series 1)
4 Number choice game
5 Feedback about outcomes and payo↵s
6 Strategy questionnaire
7 Time preference questionnaire
8 Hypothetical situations
9 Cognitive reﬂection test
10 Further questionnaires
Table 1: Order of Treatments
spillovers between the games for which we do not control. However, we are interested in the
di↵erence between leaders and non-leaders and as long as there is no interaction between the
type and the spillover, we can draw valid conclusions. Furthermore, a ﬁxed order prevents
introducing extra noise into the data. The ﬁrst part of the experiment was a series of six simple
two-player distribution games using the strategy method, similar to Engelmann and Strobel
(2004). As Bruttel (2009) argues, there seem to be spillover wealth e↵ects from the main
experiment to the decisions in such distribution games. For this reason, we conducted these
games before the main part of the experiment and not afterwards. In each game, participants
had to choose between two distributions of money between themselves and another player.
Table 2 shows the payo↵s of the options between which player 1 could choose. The six games
were designed in order to create tradeo↵s between selﬁshness, equality and e ciency.1 In the
ﬁrst column, there is a tradeo↵ between selﬁshness and equality on the one hand and e ciency
on the other. The second column contains games with a tradeo↵ between selﬁshness on the one
hand and equality and e ciency on the other hand. In the third column there is one game. In
this game there is a tradeo↵ between equality in the form of envy and e ciency. The roles of
players 1 and 2 were randomly assigned to the players after they had decided for both roles.
Only one out of the six games was randomly selected for payment. After completion of the
six choices, we elicited risk attitude using the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. The random
1Originally, we presented one more choice measuring inequality aversion to the subjects. It was excluded af-
terwards because of a typo on the computer screen in the ﬁrst series of the experiment leading to an inconsistency
in the presentation of this choice.
8draws from this part of the experiment and the corresponding payo↵s were revealed only after













Table 2: Parameters in the distribution games
2.2 Procedures
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). A total of 224 students,
95 males and 129 females, from various disciplines took part in the experiment, divided into 28
groups of 8 participants each. They were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiment
took place in the Lakelab, the laboratory for experimental economics at the University of
Konstanz between December 2009 and June 2010 (series 1, 13 groups), and in the LERN
at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg in June 2011 (series 2, 15 groups).2 Sessions in
series 1 lasted between 2 and 2.5 hours, sessions in series 2 about 1.5 hours. The sessions in
the second series were shorter because they did not contain the belief elicitation procedure.
We did not elicit beliefs in the second series to save time for ﬁlling out the large number of
questionnaires. We did so because we learned after conducting the experiments in the ﬁrst series
that many participants were tired by the long duration of the experiment and rushed through
the questionnaires without giving thoughtful answers.3 In the second series we shortened the
2We had to move to another place for the second series, because while running some sessions (which are not
included in this paper) in the Lakelab in April and May 2011 information about this experiment had become
known in the subject pool in Konstanz.
3We used two measures to identify dishonest answers. The ﬁrst one was an item “you can trust my answers”
in the big ﬁve questionnaire, according to which 18 percent of the participants cannot be trusted in their
answering behavior. The second one was an analysis of obvious patterns (e.g. choosing the very left answer
9experiment by leaving out the belief elicitation so that they started ﬁlling our the questionnaire
approximately 45 minutes after the beginning of the experiment. We also announced orally
to the subjects that they may expect ﬁlling out the questionnaires to take about 45 minutes
and emphasized that their answers are of great importance for the scientiﬁc evaluation of the
experiment.4
The experimental currency was points, with 30 points converted into 1 euro after the ex-
periment. On average, participants earned 28.77 euros in the experiment with belief elicitation
and 22.82 euros without. The protocol during the experiment was as follows: After welcom-
ing participants and explaining the main rules for participation in the experiment, they were
randomly assigned seats in the laboratory. At their place, they read short general instructions
about the sequence of experiments they would participate in. For the distribution games and
the risk elicitation, subjects received instructions on their computer screen and made decisions
immediately after reading the instructions. For the main part of the experiment, they received
written instructions explaining the decisions and their consequences as well as the belief for-
mation stage including the payment method with the quadratic scoring rule and the publicity
choice stage. Next they were given the possibility to familiarize themselves with the computer
screen for the belief formation. Then the experiment started. At the end of the session, the
participants were asked to complete several questionnaires. Players ﬁrst had to answer a ques-
tionnaire about their decisions in the number choice game. After that, they were asked to ﬁll
in several questionnaires, including the BFI-S big ﬁve questionnaire as used in the German
Socioeconomic Panel, a locus of control questionnaire according to the Rotter (1966) scale, a
shortened version of the scale of patience developed by Dudley (2003), the risk questionnaire
used in Dohmen et al. (2011), a cognitive reﬂection test (Frederick 2005), and a short sociode-
mographic questionnaire. Among these questions, we asked for the following seven variables,
referring to actual behavior in participants’ real lives, which we interpret as taking the initia-
tive: whether this person has ever been to a foreign country for a longer period of time, is
working in an honorary capacity, receives a student scholarship, took part in a youth research
for all items) in the answers to the locus of control questionnaire identifying 27 percent as very unlikely to be
honest. As the two measures were also virtually uncorrelated (correlation coe cient 0.04), we decided that we
needed a second series of experiments to obtain usable answers in the questionnaires.
4The two indices of dishonest answers in the second series were 4 percent and 8 percent, respectively.
10competition, has a function in an unincorporated association, has ever organized an event, or
was class representative at school. Out of these seven variables, taking either the value zero or
one, we create a “real life index” for participants’ inclination to take the initiative. Further-
more, we used a variant of the personal initiative questionnaire in Meyer (2006) which builds
on the questions of Bledow and Frese (2009). In this questionnaire, participants are given ﬁve
hypothetical situations with four possible ways each to behave in these situations, where only
some of the possible reactions represent personal initiative, but also the others are presented
in a way that they can all be considered socially appropriate. Participants have to state which
of the four reactions would most and least likely describe the way they would behave in such a
situation.
3 Behavioral predictions
In this section, we focus on our research question - what motivates leaders. At the beginning
of the next section, we will give the exact description of how we classify leaders. For now, we
just note that if there is common knowledge about rationality and selﬁshness, subjects should
choose 2 as their number. So, even when subjects try to coordinate on a higher number at the
beginning, directing the behavior towards the best reply of the previous period will cause a
decline in the numbers and, hence, in the payo↵ (Selten and St¨ ocker 1986). A subject displays
leadership when she breaks out of this vicious circle and increases her number. In this section,
we discuss the potential motivations for this behavior.
First, let us consider the selﬁsh motivation to lead. Some leaders in our experiment might
initiate a number increase not for the purpose of the beneﬁt of the group, but rather because
they intend to undercut others at a higher level in the next round. Such selﬁshly motivated
leadership crucially hinges on the belief on extent to which the other players will follow. Ac-
tually, G¨ achter et al. (forthcoming) ﬁnd that cooperative leaders have over-optimistic beliefs
about the cooperativeness of followers, and that this can (aside from social motivations of lead-
ers) explain their high contribution as ﬁrst mover in a sequential public good game. These
over-optimistic beliefs might be a consequence of the false consensus e↵ect (Ross et al. 1977).
It seems likely that such over-optimism is not only present for the randomly assigned leaders
11in the sequential public good game in G¨ achter et al. (forthcoming) but also in the context of
our number choice game. Thus, our ﬁrst prediction is:
Hypothesis 1 Leaders over-estimate the average numbers of their group members after lead-
ing.
Our second hypothesis refers to other-regarding preferences. Successful leadership will pro-
vide a higher payo↵ for the group, but it is potentially costly for the leader and it could in
particular create inequality that is disadvantageous for the leader. In the framework of a se-
quential public good game Arbak and Villeval (2007) ﬁnd that voluntary leadership is related
to preferences for e ciency and generosity (measured as charity donation behavior). In Table 2,
option B is always the e cient outcome. If leaders care more about e ciency than non-leaders,
we expect that leaders more frequently choose option B. In the ﬁrst column, e ciency does
not only go against selﬁshness, it also creates disadvantageous inequality, which envious people
will dislike. Since leaders risk disadvantageous inequality, we expect them to be more tolerant
towards disadvantageous inequality and to choose option B more frequently that non-leaders
in particular in the games in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.
Hypothesis 2 Leaders have stronger pro-social attitudes than non-leaders. They attach a
higher value to e ciency, they are more generous and they are more willing to accept disad-
vantageous inequality.
Leadership could be a signal of prosociality. As a prosocial attitude is generally seen as a
positive trait it might be that leaders lead because they want to signal their “good character”
to others. In our experiment, we o↵er participants an opportunity to make their seat number
publicly know. We expect that leaders use this option more frequently than non-leaders.
Hypothesis 3 Leaders are more likely to give up anonymity than non-leaders. Leaders are
more likely to give up anonymity in their leading rounds than in other rounds.
The considerations a leader makes before deciding to lead are relatively complex. In the
beginning of the game most players, including the later leaders, follow a best reply strategy
12against the distribution of numbers in their group in the previous round. This best reply
dynamic leads to decreasing numbers from round to round, because all players try to choose
a lower number than their representative opponent. The leader ﬁrst has to understand the
dynamic that all players react in a similar way to the group feedback. Second, the leader must
be innovative in exploiting this behavior. By drastically increasing the own number, the leader
manipulates the distribution of numbers the others are reacting to and reaches a temporary
coordination of the group at a higher level of numbers. This understanding and manipulation of
the dynamic decisions in this game requires a lot of innovation, creativity and cognitive ability.
It also requires the willingness to break out of the simple responding to the other players’
behavior. The cognitive reﬂection test described in Frederick (2005) captures the essence of
these abilities. This is summarized in the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 Leaders have a higher score in a cognitive reﬂection test than non-leaders.
According to Frederick (2005), the score in a cognitive reﬂection test is on average higher for
males than for females. Furthermore, Arbak and Villeval (2007) hypothesize that particularly
male participants may be concerned with maintaining a positive public image as men in their
sample act more often as voluntary leaders than women. The latter result is also found in
G¨ achter et al (forthcoming), though it is not signiﬁcant there. Matched with the information
about participants’ gender, we can also test whether male leaders are more publicity seeking
than female leaders. We formulate this as our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 Men are more likely to lead than women. In particular, men are more likely
than women to give up anonymity as leaders.
Given the cognitive e↵ort necessary before a player decides to lead, we expect that leading
decisions take longer than standard decisions, when players try to maximize their expected
proﬁts against the distribution of numbers within their group.5 We furthermore expect that
the decision to lead develops over several rounds. This implies that reaction times will slow
down one or two rounds before the leading decision. Regarding the non-leaders, we expect a
5For an interesting application or response time to economic decision making see Rubinstein 2007.
13similar pattern. Their decisions may slow down after a leading number of someone else, because
following a leader implies a new consideration between best reply behavior and following the
leader’s example.
Hypothesis 6 Leading decisions are slower than decisions of currently not leading leaders.
Decision times of leaders slow down more than one round before the leading number choice.
Leadership is risky. When deciding to provide a good example, the leader hopes that the
others will follow the example. In this case, future social welfare and potentially the leader’s
individual payo↵s will increase. However, the leader cannot be sure that others will in fact
follow. A risk averse player might therefore be reluctant to lead even if this person was willing
to set the example if it was guaranteed that others will follow. Similarly, the leader has to
be patient, because gains from leading are realized only in the future. We derive our next
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7 Leaders are less risk averse and more patient than non-leaders.
Leading-by-example is an optimistic act to improve the ine cient situation the group is
in after a phase of mutual underbidding. Taking the initiative, the leader has to trust in his
ability to change the circumstances of the interaction. We therefore hypothesize that leaders
have an internal locus of control. With respect to the other personality traits we have no
speciﬁc hypotheses concerning their impact on leadership.
Hypothesis 8 Leaders have an internal locus of control.
Finally, the power of our results depends on the external validity of the leader classiﬁcation
with respect to taking the initiative outside the lab. The experiment contains two measures
for this aspect, the “real life index” and the “index stories”. We predict that these two in-
dices correspond to our leader classiﬁcation, while we expect no signiﬁcant correlation between
leadership in the experiment and the self-stated attitude of being a leader (the explicit power
motive).
14Hypothesis 9 Leaders in the experiment are also more likely to take the initiative in their real
life outside the lab. A self-stated goal to be a leading person does not correspond to leadership
in the experiment.
4 Results
We start the review of our results with an overview of the average numbers in all 28 groups.
Figure 1 illustrates them.
In all groups, average numbers ﬂuctuate quite considerably, indicating dynamics within the
groups. Average winnings numbers follow a very similar pattern. Looking at the initial phase
of the game, we see that average numbers in most groups decrease from round to round, while
in some groups (groups 2, 5, 9, 17, 24 and 25) they start by increasing. In these groups, at least
one player chooses the number 100 in the ﬁrst round which triggers the ﬁrst upward movement
of average numbers right in the beginning of the game. Thus, the number 100 in the ﬁrst round
of the game already seems to be an instrument of leadership.
Let us next consider groups with decreasing average numbers in the ﬁrst rounds. In almost
all of these groups the downward trend of average numbers stops after at most 10 rounds and
turns into an increase instead. This later increase is always initiated by one player (sometimes
also two at the same time) increasing the number substantially. Di↵erent from leadership in the
ﬁrst round, these leaders in later rounds do not necessarily increase their number to 100. Thus
we are confronted with the problem of disentangling intended leadership from casual number
increases without a leading purpose. In order to identify intentional leaders systematically, we
use a reﬁnement of the deﬁnition introduced by Bruttel (2009). There, a leading number has
to be more than 30 points larger than the leader’s number in the round before and it has to be
larger than all numbers of all other players in this group in the previous round.6 We base our
decision also on these criteria. In our understanding leadership contains the expectation that
others will follow. We therefore deﬁne that leadership can only occur until two rounds before
the end of the game. Later high numbers may be observed for others reasons but cannot be
motivated by the intention to lead.
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Figure 1: Average numbers (black line) and average winning numbers (grey line) in the 28 groups over all 30 rounds.
16Deﬁnition: A number nit of player i in round t is called “leading number” if one of the following
conditions is satisﬁed:
1. nit = 100 if t = 1 or
2. nit(t) >n j,t 18j 2 [1;8] and nit(t) >n i,t 1 + 30 if t 2 [2;28]
The player i who places the leading number is called a “leader”.
With this deﬁnition, we identify 83 out of 200 subjects as leaders.7 Accordingly, 117 subjects
are classiﬁed as non-leaders. Once leaders are identiﬁed according to the above deﬁnition we
group them into the two subcategories “early” and “late” leaders. Early leaders are the ﬁrst
leaders in their group, late leaders are all subsequent leaders. Late leadership is a weaker
variant of leading for several reasons. The innovative aspect of leadership disappears if the
leader has already observed someone else leading. Thus, late leaders do not necessarily have
to have above-average cognitive skills. Late leaders have also already observed the reaction of
their group to leadership. Therefore, they have an easier task in forming a belief about the
potential gains and losses of leadership for the leader and the consequences for group e ciency.
Out of the total 83 leaders 31 are early leaders8 and 52 late leaders. In each group, we are able
to identify at least one early and one late leader. The only exception is group 7, where we have
two early leaders in the ﬁrst round, but no late leader. More than half of the leading numbers
had the value 100.
4.1 Does leadership pay for the leader - and what do they expect?
We start our analysis of the characteristics of leaders with the question of whether leadership is
proﬁtable for the leaders. Figure 2 depicts average proﬁts of early, late and non-leaders. Leaders
7We excluded the data from matching groups number 12, 14 and 15 from the further analysis. In these
groups, one participant continuously set the number 100 over almost the whole duration of the game. This
disabled us from classifying the remaining seven participants in these groups into late leaders and non-leaders,
because they had no chance to lead during the whole experiment, even if they wanted to.
8There are more early leaders than matching groups, because it happened several times that two subjects
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Figure 2: Proﬁts in the number choice game.
earn signiﬁcantly less than non-leaders (p-value = 0.01).9 This ﬁnding is not surprising given
that leaders deliberately forgo the possibility to win their match while leading. More relevant
for the motivation of leaders (and much more di cult to answer) is the question whether leaders
beneﬁt from leading compared to the counterfactual situation in which they do not lead - and
whether they correctly anticipate their net monetary loss or beneﬁt from leading. We cannot
answer the ﬁrst question because we do not have a reference point which we could compare
leaders’ proﬁts with. However, we can say that they are very good in anticipating the extent
to which others will follow their good example, which is the basis for their own expected loss
or gain from leading. We use the beliefs submitted for the average number of the seven fellow
participants. If leaders overestimated the average number of the others, it was very likely
that they overestimated their gain from leading as well. Leaders are generally very good in
estimating the reaction of others after their leading bid. If at all, they slightly under- rather
than overestimate the average number of the seven other participants in the round after their
leading bid (by about 4 units on the scale from 2 to 100). The quality of their estimate does not
depend on whether they are currently leading or not, and it is also not di↵erent from the quality
9For a statistical comparison of leaders and non-leaders we treat each matching group of eight participants
as one independent observation. Thus, we consider 25 independent observations, 12 for the ﬁrst series and 13
for the second series. Within each group, we average the scores for each measure, e.g. the proﬁt, over all early
leaders, late leaders and non-leaders separately. All reported signiﬁcance levels in this paper are then obtained
(if nothing else is stated) in one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests testing the measures of (early or late) leaders
against the non-leaders in each matching group. We do not correct for multiple hypothesis testing since we have
ex ante hypotheses for almost all tests that we conduct.
18of the estimates of the non-leaders. We conclude that over-optimistic beliefs as in G¨ achter et
al. (forthcoming) are not driving leadership in the framework of our number choice game. This
makes it unlikely that selﬁsh motives are the major driving force for taking the initiative.
Result 1 (i) Leadership does not pay, compared with the income of non-leaders. (ii) Leaders
have realistic beliefs about how much the followers respond to their leading decision.
The decision to lead might not only depend on the belief whether others will follow but also
on the belief whether someone else in the group will take the initiative instead. To capture
this belief, players had to submit an estimate for the probability distribution over the intervals
2-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 81-100 of the maximum of the other seven numbers in their group
in each round. Figure 3 illustrates the actual average values of the others’ maximum and
the corresponding beliefs of leaders who are currently leading, leaders who are currently not
leading and non-leaders. The data behind this illustration contains only values from rounds
where leading was generally possible, i.e. rounds in which the maximum number in the round
before was smaller than 100 and the minimum number was smaller than 70. To approximate
the belief of whether there is another leader, we usually consider the percentage weight given
to the category that the maximum of the other seven numbers falls into the interval from 81 to
100. If the leading bid was smaller than 100, we sum up the percentage values of the intervals
around and above the leading bid. A similar procedure was used to determine whether there
actually was another leader.10 In line with the argumentation of a false consensus e↵ect (Ross
et al., 1977) leaders would generally overestimate others’ willingness to lead (p-value = 0.24,
two-sided test) while non-leaders underestimate the probability that there would be a leader
(p-value = 0.00, two-sided test). However, in their leading round, leaders underestimate others’
willingness to lead (p-value = 0.05, two-sided test). In our interpretation, this pessimistic belief
about the probability that others will lead additionally motivates leaders to take the initiative.
10Here, we used a di↵erent leader deﬁnition than above. Basically all players are treated as alternative leaders
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Figure 3: Belief that others will lead.
4.2 Leaders attach a high value to e ciency
Figure 4 summarizes the decisions of all participants in the role of player 1 in the distribution
games. Leaders have stronger preferences for e ciency and they are more generous. We ﬁnd
the most notable di↵erence for early leaders when there is a conﬂict between e ciency and
equality. In this game, early leaders have an e ciency score of 1.52, while the late leaders and
the followers chose the e cient option in less than one case. Table 3 summarizes the signiﬁcance
levels. For e ciency concerns it holds that early leaders choose the e cient option more often
than all other players, and late leaders score higher than non-leaders. For generosity we observe
a similar pattern, only the di↵erence between late and non-leaders is just not signiﬁcant. With
respect to inequality aversion, the major di↵erence is between leaders and non-leaders, with
no signiﬁcant distinction between early and late leaders. Taken together, the results from the
distribution games indicate that concerns for others’ outcomes are a driving force for leading-
by-example. Leaders are more pro-socially minded than non-leading players.
early vs. no leader early vs. late late vs. no leader
E ciency 0.00*** 0.01** 0.07*
Inequality Aversion 0.02** 0.17 0.09*
Generosity 0.02** 0.03** 0.12
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Generosity
Figure 4: Valuation of e ciency, inequality and generosity.
Result 2 Leaders attach a high value to the maximization of others welfare. Early leaders are
more willing to accept disadvantageous inequity than others when it is in conﬂict with e ciency.
4.3 Leaders like attention?
Leaders might lead not because they want to do something good for their group, but because
they want their group to see that they are doing something good. To test for the motivation
of a positive public image our experiment in the ﬁrst series of sessions introduced a publicity
feature. In each period, players can pay to give up anonymity. They have to click a button on
a separate screen after their number choice and have to pay 10 points. If they choose to give up
anonymity, their seat number is displayed next to their selected number on the feedback screen
for all players in the group in that round. Figure 5 shows that leaders indeed use this feature.
In leading rounds, around 17 percent of the leaders opt for publicity; one round later (when the
leaders often still have the highest number in their group), this holds for 12 percent of them. In
comparison, non-leaders pay for publicity in less than 1 percent of their decisions and currently
not leading leaders in only 3 percent. The di↵erences between leaders and non-leaders as well
as between leaders in t or t   1 and currently not leading leaders are statistically signiﬁcant
(both p-values = 0.03). As expected, men use the publicity feature on average more often than
women, but the di↵erences between them are far from being signiﬁcant.
Adding the highlight option remarkably reduces the use of the publicity feature by leaders
in the second series while the highlight option, if available, is used by 40 percent of the leaders.
The di↵erences between leaders and non-leaders in the use of the publicity feature and between
leaders in t or t 1 and currently not leading leaders are no longer signiﬁcant (the corresponding











Leader in t Leader in t-1 Leader, but not
in t and t-1
Non-leader Leader in t Leader in t-1 Leader, but not
in t and t-1
Non-leader
Publicity only Highlight and Publicity
Publicity
Highlight
Figure 5: Frequency of payment for giving up anonymity and for highlighting a number.
use both the publicity feature and the highlight option more often than women without the
di↵erence being statistically signiﬁcant.
Both highlighting and giving up anonymity have the desired e↵ect to attract attention and
strenghthen the signal for coordination within the group. More participants increase their
number after a leading bid with (61 percent) than without (44 percent) three exclamation
marks aside (p-value = 0.01). Publication of the leader’s seat number has a similar, though
not signiﬁcant e↵ect.11
Result 3 Leaders want to direct other’s attention to their leading behavior, but they are not
more likely to reveal their identity than non-leaders.
4.4 Leaders have to think
After the main experiment, all participants had to answer three questions from a cognitive
reﬂection test (CRT). There was no incentive for giving a correct answer and no feedback.
Each correct answer gives one point in our evaluation so that participants could get between
zero and three points in this task. Figure 6 shows that leaders have a signiﬁcantly higher
score on the cognitive reﬂection test than non-leaders (p-value = 0.00). The di↵erence is also











Figure 6: Scores in the cognitive reﬂection test.
signiﬁcant between early and late leaders (p-value = 0.01) and between late and non-leaders
(p-value = 0.02).
In line with Frederick (2005), men score higher in the cognitive reﬂection test than women.
In fact, men are signiﬁcantly more often leaders than women (p-values: early vs. no leader =
0.00, early vs. late = 0.00, late vs. no leader = 0.16). Out of the early leaders, 68 percent
are males, and 44 percent of the late leaders, while only 37 percent of the non-leaders are men.
However, the relative di↵erence of the CRT scores for leaders and non-leaders does not depend
on gender as can be seen in the second and third group of bars in Figure 6 (p-values leaders
vs. non-leaders: males = 0.03, females = 0.10). Thus, the special kind of intelligence measured
by the cognitive reﬂection test and more frequently observed with men, seems to be a driving
force for leading-by-example in the experiment. A regression analysis reveals that this result
is statistically signiﬁcant. While the variable male signiﬁcantly a↵ects the leading probability
without further control, it does not when we control for the performance in the CRT task.
Result 4 Leaders are more willing to use their cognitive capabilities.
Result 5 Men are more likely leaders. This result is driven by the di↵erence between women
and men in the cognitive reﬂection task.
A second piece of evidence from the recording of reaction times supports this interpretation.
Figure 7 illustrates the average time which leaders spend in the belief formation stage and in
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Figure 7: Reaction times.
signiﬁcantly before their leading decision while the actual decision making gets even faster in
the leading round. Similarly, in the session without the belief stage, decision times slow down
before the leading round and get faster in the leading round itself. The regressions in Table
4 show that reaction times of leaders slow down before the decision to lead. “Ever leader?”
distinguishes leaders from non-leaders, because it might be that leaders are generally slower
or faster than non-leaders in their decisions. The variables “Leader”, “Leader in t + 1?”, and
“Leader in t+2?” are dummy variables equal to one if the subject is a leader in the respective
round. Using them, the regression captures changes in the response times in the leading round
and two rounds before compared to rounds in which the person in consideration acts as a leader
neither in the current nor in the two subsequent rounds. As can be seen in the ﬁrst regression,
the formation of beliefs lasts signiﬁcantly longer in the leading round and already one round
before. The time for the actual number choice in the second and third regression slows down
in the two rounds before leading and quickens in the actual leading round, signiﬁcantly only in
series 1 with the preceding belief stage.
Our understanding of this change in reaction times is that the decision to lead develops
while participants are forced to think about others’ behavior in the belief formation stage. The
fast leading decision itself could be interpreted to be a self-commitment not to rethink the
courageous decision to take the initiative. As the decision to lead seems to develop over time,
it could also be that ﬁnally entering 100 (as most leaders do when they lead) gets simply faster
than selecting a number potentially maximizing proﬁt against the numbers of the other players.
Result 6 Leading decisions are faster than other decisions. Belief formation times of leaders
slow down more than one round before the leading round.
24Log belief time Log decision time
Series 1 Series 2
Round -0.0308*** -0.0114*** -0.0166***
(0.00308) (0.00169) (0.00201)
Ever leader? -0.0211 0.110* 0.0214
(0.0620) (0.0566) (0.0449)
Leader in t? 0.269** -0.187** -0.112
(0.0989) (0.0822) (0.0779)
Leader in t + 1? 0.310*** 0.0653 0.0786
(0.0922) (0.0593) (0.0743)
Leader in t + 2? 0.115 0.0688 0.0621
(0.119) (0.0558) (0.0647)
Constant 3.443*** 3.066*** 3.008***
(0.0710) (0.0444) (0.0418)
Table 4: Regression coe cients: log of time spend in belief stage and decision stage. Standard errors in brackets. *** denotes
signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Standard errors are clustered by matching group.
The reaction times of followers after a leading number further support the idea that reaction
times provide a measure for the intensity of thought before a decision. The decision times for
the number choice of followers signiﬁcantly (p-value = 0.00) slow down in the round after a
leading number (21.99 seconds) compared to rounds where no leading number was set in the two
previous rounds (19.00 seconds). In the second round after a leading number, average decision
times are with 19.83 seconds still slower (p-value = 0.00). The di↵erences remain signiﬁcant
when considering the data from the ﬁrst and second series separately. Belief formation times
in series 1 get slower as well. In the round immediately after a leading number, the average
belief formation time is 27.60 seconds, compared to 24.33 seconds in rounds without a leading
number in the two previous rounds (p-value = 0.03). Two periods after a leading number, the
belief formation lasts 28.59 seconds, which is again signiﬁcantly (p-value = 0.01) more than in
normal rounds.
4.5 Personality measures
Risk aversion, as measured by the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery procedure has no signiﬁcant
e↵ect on leadership. Early leaders are a little less (average number of safe choices 5.35), late
leaders a little more (5.81) risk averse than non-leaders (5.70), but the p-values in Table 5 are
far from any reasonable level of signiﬁcance. Also the self-stated risk attitude does not di↵er
25signiﬁcantly between leaders and non-leaders. This contradicts our hypothesis that leaders
have a more positive attitude towards risk than non-leaders. The reason might be that the risk
of leadership is di↵erent from (and hardly correlated with) the risk measured with the Holt
and Laury (2002) lotteries. Their procedure generates risk as random draws between lotteries
while the risk of leadership is a behavioral risk depending on the reaction of followers. The
former requires calculation of expected values while the latter depends on the ability to deal
with strategic uncertainty.
early vs. no leader early vs. late late vs. no leader
Holt & Laury risk aversion 0.22 0.17 0.47
Self-stated risk aversion 0.12 0.50 0.16
Patience 0.03** 0.35 0.02**
Locus of control 0.08* 0.03** 0.50
Table 5: Statistical tests for decisions in the distribution games, risk attitude, and gender.
Patience is required from both early and late leaders as they have to wait for future rounds
to regain the proﬁts waived while leading. As can be seem from Figure 8 and Table 5, both
types of leaders score signiﬁcantly higher on the scale of patience than non-leaders.12
Result 7 Leaders are more patient than non-leaders. Risk aversion does not play a role for
the decision to take the initiative.
Following Piatek and Pinger (2010), we think that the locus of control should be considered
a unidimensional concept. The distinction into an internal and an external dimension of the
locus of control as implemented, for example, by Caliendo, Cobb-Clark and Uhlendor↵ (2010)
does not seem convincing to us. A factor analysis for the locus of control scale indicates that
item 1 had a negative loading on the main factor. Items 4, 6 and 9 neither load on the same
factor as the other seven items nor on a joint second factor. Consequently, our index of the
locus of control recodes item 1 and excludes the items 4, 6 and 9. This procedure also delivers
the highest value for internal consistency as measured by Cronbach’s Alpha, 0.637. For the
12The questionnaires for patience, locus of control and big ﬁve personality traits included the statement “You
can trust my answers.” as the last item. Subjects selecting an answer of less than the maximum minus 1 unit
to this item were not considered in the analysis. This concerns four subjects in the big ﬁve questionnaire, six in
the locus of control questionnaire, and three in the patience questionnaire, with considerable overlap between
questionnaires.
26patience and the big ﬁve questionnaire no such adjustments are necessary as already the full
scales deliver very reasonable values for Cronbach’s Alpha.
Figure 8 illustrates that an internal locus of control corresponds to leadership in the exper-
iment. The main di↵erence for the locus of control in our experiment is between early leaders
and late leaders with rather no di↵erence between late leaders and non-leaders. Intuitively,
only early leaders need intrinsic conﬁdence that their behavior can change their environment
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Figure 8: Patience and locus of control (a high value indicates an internal locus of control).
None of the big ﬁve personality traits has a signiﬁcant e↵ect on leadership. Figure 9 il-
lustrates the scores of early leaders, late leaders and non-leaders with respect to all ﬁve traits
showing that there are almost no di↵erences between the types. If at all, a low score on the
scale for neuroticism seems to be associated with leadership in the experiment (p-value early
vs. non-leaders = 0.09, two-sided test). It seems that leadership is a personality trait that is
independent of the established personality traits more related to social preferences.
Result 8 Leaders have a more internal locus of control. Other personality traits do not play a
role for leadership in the experiment.
4.6 External validity
Figure 10 reports two measures for the external validity of our classiﬁcation of subjects into
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Figure 9: Personality traits.
life index” consists of the sum of the values of the seven variables revealing participants’ actual
propensity to take the initiative in real life. “Index stories” refers to the sum of points received
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Figure 10: Two measures of external validity.
Both indices illustrate that being classiﬁed as a leader in the number choice game corre-
sponds to taking the initiative in life outside the lab. For the real life index, early leaders on
average receive a score of 3.20 while non-leaders have a score of only 2.35 (p-value = 0.02).
Late leaders are not signiﬁcantly di↵erent from non-leaders with respect to this index. For the
13We excluded the data of two subjects (number 202 and 223) from this part of the analysis, because they
stated orally during the experiment that they misunderstood the question and answered the ﬁrst questions in
this part randomly before asking for an explanation of the question.
28story index, we ﬁnd that both early and late leaders score higher than non-leaders (p-value
leaders vs. non-leaders = 0.05).
On top of the hard facts revealed in the real life index we also assessed participants’ self-
evaluation of their proneness to take the initiative. They had to classify themselves as more or
less “initiative-taking”, they were asked whether they would like to work in a leading position,
and what role they typically have in a student work group. None of these self-stated measures
illustrated in Figure 11 corresponds signiﬁcantly to taking the initiative in the experiment.
Taken together with the rare use of the publicity option by leaders in the experiment, we have
strong evidence for the interpretation that taking the initiative is a facet of personality which
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Wants to be in a leading position when working
Figure 11: Measures of self-assessed proneness to take the initiative.
Result 9 (i) Leadership according to the behavior in the number choice game corresponds to
the degree of taking the initiative in participants’ real lives. (ii) The self-stated claim to be a
leader does not correspond to leadership according to the behavior in the number choice game.
5 Conclusion
What are the motives behind leadership? We address this question for a particular type of lead-
ership, taking the initiative. We combine an experimental design in which leadership develops
endogenously with several other small games and questionnaires to explore possible charac-
teristics and motives of leaders. Our design permits classiﬁcation of subjects as leaders and
non-leaders and to study the determinants of leadership. We ﬁnd that traditional personal-
ity measures are not predictive for leading-by-example, but characteristics such as an internal
locus of control and patience are. Further main determinants are that leaders attach a high
29value to e ciency, are not envious and they have better cognitive abilities than non-leaders.
We can show that taking the initiative in the experiment corresponds to similar behavior in
participants’ real lives outside the lab, but it does not correlate with the self-stated intention
to be a leader.
Leadership, and in particular leading-by-example is an important and desired trait for many
jobs. Thus, measurement devices and the pattern of determinants of this behavior are highly
desirable. Our results suggest that traditional personality traits are not very predictive for this
behavior. This implies that leadership has to be assessed in a di↵erent way. We do not claim
that our experiment provides the only way to do so. For example, it is not deception proof, and
the measure of leadership depends on the comparison group. Once participants know about the
purpose of the game, the classiﬁcation into leaders and non-leaders according to behavior in
that game is hardly possible. Nevertheless, it provides interesting insights into the mechanism
of taking the initiative and suggests a new way to measure a disposition for taking the initiative.
30Appendix: instructions
General instructions at the beginning
Welcome and thank you for participating in this economic experiment.
This experiment consists of multiple parts. The instructions for the ﬁrst two parts of the
experiment will be displayed on your computer screen. The instructions for the third part will
be handed out later in hard copy. All instructions are identical for all participants.
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions regarding the experiment
please raise your hand. We will then come directly to your place. Please be quiet during the
experiment and do not talk to other participants. Failure to comply with these rules will result
in an exclusion from the experiment. If this occurs you will not receive any payment.
After you have completed all three parts of the experiment please ﬁll out the following
questionnaires on your computer screen. Afterwards you will receive your payment for the entire
experiment. The order in which participants receive their payments is already determined,
beginning with the participant sitting at the computer “lakelab 1”. So take your time to ﬁll in
the questionnaires. Your speed will have no inﬂuence on the timing of your payment.
Instructions for the number choice game
Now we will start with the third part of the experiment. After this part the experiment will
be over and we will ask you to ﬁll out some questionnaires.
Your gains and losses during the experiment are counted in points. The exchange rate is 30
points for 1 euro. Your payment in this part of the experiment depends on your decisions and
on the decisions of other participants.
This experiment will last for 30 rounds. In each round you will be asked to choose a number
between 2 and 100. Subsequently, the computer will randomly determine one participant out
of a group of eight and compare the numbers you and the other participant have chosen. The
participant who selected the smaller number receives as many points as her number. The other
31participant receives zero points in this round. If both of you selected the same number, each of
you gets half of the points. At the end of each round you are informed about your payment in
points and about the numbers all participants of your group have chosen. The composition of
your group of eight does not vary during the 30 rounds. Out of this group in each round one
participant will be randomly chosen and your numbers will be compared.
In each round before choosing a number you will be asked to make an estimate about
the numbers which the other seven participants of your group are going to choose in this
round. More speciﬁcally, you have to submit your belief about what is going to be the highest,
the lowest and the average number of the other seven participants. We ask you to forecast
the probability of these three numbers (maximum, minimum and average) being within the
following intervals: 2-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80 and 81-100. For each of the ﬁve intervals you
have to indicate the percentage value of the three numbers (maximum, minimum, average)
being within these intervals. The ﬁve percentage values add up to a total of 100%, because the
numbers have to be within one of the intervals no matter what. We place a graphical computer
program at your disposal so you can enter your beliefs. You will have the opportunity to
familiarize yourself with the program before the experiment begins. Here you can see what the
program looks like:
Figure 12: Belief formation tool.
32You can change the height of the bars implemented in the program by clicking on a bar,
holding the left mouse button and moving the mouse. Do not worry about whether the per-
centage values add up to 100 or not. Just change the heights of the bars until their proportions
match the relative probability you propose. Then click on the button “update” next to the
diagram. The bars are automatically adjusted so the values of your estimates sum up to 100.
After entering your belief for minimum, maximum and average please click on “next”. Next
you can choose your number for the coming round.
There will also be a payment for the accuracy of your guess. The exact computation of this
accuracy-dependent payment is described in detail in the appendix. If you have no interest in
the details, feel free to ignore the explanations concerning this matter. The only important
thing you have to know is that you maximize your payment by indicating your true beliefs.
From the second round on, your previous estimates will be the default setting, so you only
have to indicate new numbers in case you want to adjust your previous estimates.
Your decisions in this experiment are always anonymous. The other participants of your
group can only see the number you (and all the other participants) have chosen, but not the
number of the computer you are sitting at. The numbers are ordered by size. So it is not
possible to draw conclusions about participants’ seats from the numbers. If in a particular
round you want the other participants not only to know the number you have chosen, but also
the number of the computer you are sitting at, you can determine so with a mouse click on
your computer screen. To disclose the number of your seat you have to pay 10 points.
Before the experiment begins you have the opportunity to familiarize yourself with the
computer program. After the experiment please ﬁll in the questionnaires. You will be paid in
cash directly after the end of the experiment and after you have ﬁnished the questionnaires.
If you have any further questions regarding the conducting of the experiment, please give a
short notice to the supervisors of the experiment. We will then come directly to your place.
Payment for probability estimates
As previously described, for the three numbers maximum, minimum and average you allo-
cate ﬁve probability values pi to the ﬁve intervals 2-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80 and 81-100. The
33actual number (for example the minimum) lies later in one of these intervals. For one prob-
ability estimate you can earn 2 points at most. If your estimate is not accurate there will
be subtractions from the 2 points. The probabilities you have assigned to intervals in which
the actual number does not lie, will be squared and subtracted from your maximal payment.
For example, if you set 70% on the lowest interval but the actual number does not lie in this
interval, 0.49 = 0.70⇤0.70 points will be subtracted from your payment. Furthermore, it is dis-
advantageous if the probability value you distributed to the interval in which the actual number
lies deviates signiﬁcantly from 100%. This deviation will also be squared and subtracted from
your payment. If you set 60% on the right interval, (1   0.60) ⇤ (1   0.60) = 0.16 points would
be subtracted.
The smaller the sum of the squared wrong estimates is, the better was your guess. For those
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In each round the computer will calculate the quality Q of your estimate for minimum,
maximum and average number. The higher the quality Q is, the better was your guess in
that particular round. At the end of the 30 rounds of the experiment your 30 values of Q
for minimum, maximum and average will be summed up. This value will be added to your
payment in points.
Examples
In the following we will describe some examples of the calculation of the quality of your
estimate and demonstrate some useful tips on how to improve your estimate.
If you think that the smallest of the seven numbers of the other participants of your group
deﬁnitely is equal to or smaller than 20, you say the probability of the minimum being within
the interval 2-20 is 100% and the probability for the minimum being within one of the other
intervals is 0%. In this case you gain 2 points if your guess is correct and no points are
subtracted for false estimations, because you were 100% right. If you had distributed 20% to
each of the ﬁve intervals, you would have scored only 1.2 points. In general: if you are sure
about the actual number not being within a certain interval, it is better for you to assign a
probability of 0% to this interval. Intentional probability “dispersion” does not pay o↵.
34If you think that the highest of the seven numbers of the other participants of your group is
either in the interval 61-80 or is higher than 80, but you are sure that the maximum deﬁnitely
lies above 60, you should assign the value 50% to both intervals 61-80 and 81-100. In this case,
your expected payo↵ is higher than in case you assigned 100% probability to only one of the
intervals: If you assign 50% to both of the intervals, you surely gain 1.5 points. If you assigned
the entire 100% to one of the intervals, you gained 2 points in case you were right and 0 points
in case you were wrong. So your expected payo↵ would be only 1 point. In general: If you
think that a given number is possibly within several intervals and the probability of the number
being in each of these intervals is equal, it is best for you to enter equal probabilities to these
intervals.
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